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The Ethnopolitical Dynamics of Elections 
Stefan WOLFF* 
 
I. Introduction 
Elections are a key element in any political process because of their rule-legitimating 
function. They are, therefore, frequently used instruments at different levels of the 
political process (from local government to presidential elections) and in most types 
of political systems (from democracies to single-party totalitarian systems). In 
democratic and democratizing systems in particular, elections serve a variety of 
different purposes in addition to legitimating rule, including providing an institution 
for the expression of the popular will and providing mechanisms for peaceful change 
in government.  
 
In multiethnic societies,1 elections have critical implications for the way in which the 
political process is conducted, precisely because they are about choice.2 At a very 
basic level, the acceptability of elections as way of (democratic) politics is at stake. 
Unless elections are perceived as having the potential of resulting in post-election 
institutions and politics that are broadly representative of the interests of a range of 
political actors, they are unlikely to be widely accepted among political elites and 
their constituencies (especially those that sense exclusion and discrimination) and are 
therefore unlikely to contribute to the establishment and/or preservation of non-
violent, democratic political processes. This is closely related to a second dimension 
of acceptability, namely to that of the electoral system according to which elections 
are to be conducted. If electoral systems are adopted that predictably lead to the 
exclusion or gross under-representation of certain groups, these groups have little 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at Annual World Convention of the Association of 
Nationality Studies in April 2003 in New York. This revised version is the result of fruitful discussions 
with Marc Weller and Eben Friedman during my stay at the European Centre for Minority Issues in 
Flensburg, Germany. I am also grateful to Kelly Burke for her careful and insightful copy-editing of the 
final text. The usual disclaimer remains. 
1 By multiethnic societies I mean societies in which at least two different ethnic groups coexist and in 
which ethnicity and/or ethnic group membership are politically relevant. For the purposes of this paper, 
I do not distinguish further as to the character of such societies (ranked/unranked, divided/deeply 
divided, etc.).  
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incentive to legitimate such elections and their outcomes by participating in them. By 
the same token, even if elections as such and the rules according to which they are 
held are acceptable, this does not necessarily foreshadow a peaceful and stable 
democratic process in the aftermath. If the conduct of elections is flawed, if vote-
rigging and intimidation occur, or if the outcome of elections is influenced in any 
other unfair way, elections will hardly pave the way towards establishing or 
maintaining a democratic process.  
 
These negative case scenarios are meant merely as illustrations of what can 
potentially go wrong with elections, but not as a general deterrent against them. 
Elections play a crucial role in multiethnic societies both as potential catalysts of 
conflict and as mechanisms contributing to conflict termination, democratization, and 
sustainable, peaceful, democratic political processes. With these considerations in 
mind, this paper will examine the factors that contribute to elections in multiethnic 
societies resulting in stable and inclusive (or widely representative) political 
institutions. First, I look at different types of context in which elections are conducted 
– conflict termination, democratization, and full or consolidated democracy. Then I 
examine different aspects of elections themselves – election systems, campaigns, 
conduct and results – before offering some general conclusions about electoral and 
post-electoral politics in multiethnic societies. To begin with, I explore the concepts 
of stability and inclusiveness in multiethnic societies as the key objectives for 
elections to contribute to. 
 
II. Stability and Inclusiveness in Multiethnic Societies 
For the purpose of this paper, I define stability as the capacity of a system of political 
institutions to command authority, pass and implement legislation, maintain public 
order and security, and respond to changes in public opinion (cf. Reynolds and Sisk 
1998: 22). Inclusiveness is the degree to which different branches of government 
                                                                                                                                            
2 This is not to say that elections have lesser implications in ethnically more homogeneous societies. 
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(legislature, executive, judiciary, and civil service) reflect the population diversity 
within the society they are elected and/or appointed to govern.3  
Figure 1 uses these two categories – stability and inclusiveness – to characterize four 
different types of political process that can be conceived of in multiethnic societies.4 
Quadrant A (stable and inclusive political process) is obviously the most desirable 
one. Institutional designs that correspond with it are power-sharing systems of either 
the Lijphartian or Horowitzian kind (i.e., consociational or integrative power-sharing), 
federalism and other forms of territorial autonomy designed to accommodate 
regionally concentrated ethnic groups. Here, different ethnic groups and their elites 
have accepted the relevant institutional set-up as a viable and beneficial arrangement 
to deal with a wide range of political issues that concern all of them more or less 
equally. Examples include Belgium and Mauritius (power-sharing), Switzerland and 
Canada (federalism), Spain and Italy (different degrees of territorial 
autonomy/asymmetric federalism).  
 
Quadrant B (stable but exclusive political process) is a state of affairs described by 
Lustick as control regime: one or more weaker ethnic groups are dominated by a 
stronger one (or a coalition of stronger ones). Stability is achieved through 
domination; the political process is democratic only insofar as it relates to the 
dominant groups, as is or was the case in French Algeria, Israel, and Northern Ireland 
under the old Stormont system before 1972 (cf. Lustick 1980, 1993). 
 
The inclusive, but unstable political systems in quadrant C are normally characterized 
by an inability of political elites to form durable governments that command sufficient 
support within the legislature to deliver substantive policies to the benefit of the whole 
society, rather than specific clienteles. In such systems, there is usually a mismatch 
between institutions (e.g., electoral system and design of government branches) or 
between institutions and the political agendas of elites that are working within them 
                                                 
3 Inclusiveness and stability in my usage are broadly similar or equivalent to what others might 
describe as institutional legitimacy or policy. I am grateful to Shale Horowitz for pointing this out to 
me. 
4 Given the way in which I define multiethnic societies for the purposes of this paper, 
integration/assimilation are not considered relevant types of institutional design here. In addition, 
minority rights systems are not treated as types of institutional design in themselves, but as 
complementing, to varying degrees, stable and/or inclusive institutional designs.  
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(inclusion/integration-orientated institutions vs. exclusion/separation-orientated 
elites). Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the two examples that spring 
immediately to mind in this context as transitional systems and/or failing/failed 
power-sharing systems. 
 
Finally, quadrant D represents the least desirable situation in a multiethnic, or for that 
matter any otherwise diverse society: an unstable and exclusive political process on 
the brink of violence or already beyond it. Many ethnic conflicts in the last decade, for 
example in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, lapsed into violence when 
institutional instability combined with attempts by majority ethnic groups to assert 
control of institutions, thereby effectively excluding (i.e., denying access) minorities 
from meaningful participation in public life. 
 
Obviously, the four quadrants are ideal types, and there are numerous shades of grey 
in the ‘border areas’. The important point I want to make, however, has less to do with 
the quadrants themselves and more with cases moving from one quadrant into another 
and the catalyst function that elections might play in this process. Figures 2 and 3 
indicate potential directions in which political processes in multiethnic societies might 
evolve. Moves between quadrants A and C and between quadrants B and D (i.e., 
between stability and instability without a change in the degree of 
inclusion/exclusion) can be caused by a variety of factors, such as changes in the 
demographic balance (due to higher/lower birth rates and/or immigration and 
emigration), changes in the power balance (shifting internal and external alliances, 
intervention by third parties, etc.), and other structural changes (e.g., in the electoral 
system or the design of governmental institutions). 
 
Movements between quadrants A and B and between quadrants C and D (i.e., 
between different degrees of inclusion/exclusion without affecting the overall stability 
of the political system in question) are most likely to be caused by conscious choices 
made at the elite level. That is to say, while instability is hardly a reasonable political 
goal in itself (even though it can appear beneficial as a tactic in a more comprehensive 
and longer-term political strategy) and thus unlikely to be pursued deliberately, 
inclusion and exclusion may seem rational political choices for elites at different 
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junctures of political and social development. Moves between A and B, for example, 
may be contemplated by elites when the alternative to maintain a given degree of 
inclusion/exclusion would be descent into instability: power-sharing may seem less 
daunting a prospect than civil war (BàA is preferable over BàD, the South African 
and Northern Irish examples), while assuming control may seem more appropriate in 
the eyes of some compared to maintaining an inclusive, yet apparently increasingly 
unstable system (AàB is preferable over AàC, with several qualifications, the 
Yugoslav example). Movements between A and B and C and D also reflect a greater 
concern for group-specific, rather than wider social interests. Movements from A to B 
are meant to preserve overall stability, albeit at the price of excluding one or more 
ethnic groups from meaningful political participation, whereas the reverse move 
(BàA) is also meant to preserve stability, but at the price of extending access to a 
previously excluded group. For moves between C and D it is reasonable to assume 
that the aim is not a different kind of instability, but that the ultimate agenda of 
political elites is to achieve either exclusive or inclusive stability. For moves from D 
to C, it is likely that several attempts to achieve a stable and exclusive regime have 
failed and that a strategic choice has therefore been made with the aim of achieving 
stability via opening public institutions to broader participation (DàB impossible, 
therefore DàC with the aim of eventually moving CàA, with some qualifications 
the Macedonian example). In contrast, for moves from C to D the assumption is that 
inclusive stability is either impossible or that inclusion is politically undesirable and 
that there is a reasonable chance that stability can eventually be achieved through 
control (CàA impossible or undesirable, therefore CàD with a view to eventually 
also moving DàB, the Chechen example).  
 
Two qualifications of this are necessary: first, in reality the described moves are 
unlikely to be ‘straight’, i.e., a move between A and B, for example, is unlikely to 
maintain the exact same degree of stability; second, triangular moves are more likely 
to be intended as diagonal ones, i.e., a move from D to C to A, for example will 
accept that inclusion does not immediately bring stability, but the rational of the entire 
move will be to achieve such inclusive stability, hence it will figure in any political 
agenda as a move from D to A. 
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What does all this mean for the role of elections in multiethnic societies? First, it 
means that elections (and electoral systems) can be instruments of change in relation 
to levels of stability and degrees of inclusion (see Figure 3). Even though it is unlikely 
that elections alone will facilitate change, they are important, deliberately chosen 
elements in a wider political agenda. Second, change in levels of stability and degrees 
of inclusion can also occur as an unintended consequence of elections (and electoral 
systems). Thus, not all moves between the four quadrants outlined above are always 
intentional: ethnopolitics becoming more exclusive can be part of a deliberate strategy 
of one ethnic group to move towards a control regime (e.g., by changing the electoral 
formula, redrawing constituency boundaries, etc.), but it can also be a consequence of 
changes in the demographic balance in a particular region or a society as a whole 
(particular related to migration patterns). Demographic pressure, real or imagined, can 
also lead to increasing instability as it may contribute to greater levels of polarization 
and radicalization among different ethnic groups. Similar developments can be caused 
by resource conflicts (e.g., the discovery of oil in one region of a country inhabited by 
one ethnic group but not another) and intraethnic party competition (hardliners vs. 
moderates). By the same token, sudden, unintended inclusiveness may pose problems 
for the stability of government institutions in a situation in which these institutions, or 
society as a whole, are ill-equipped to deal with the prospect of coalition government.  
 
III. The Context of Elections 
At different times, societies are characterized by the salience of different policy 
issues. It is my contention that the salience of specific issues (ethnic, ideological, 
local, national, economic, environmental, social, etc.) potentially has a direct bearing 
on the outcome of elections in multiethnic societies. In other words, the success of 
electoral engineering is dependent, to some extent, on what issues dominate local and 
central-state politics and how these issues are portrayed in election campaigns. It is 
therefore important to be aware of the concrete context in which elections are to be 
conducted when assessing the usefulness and potential effectiveness of electoral 
engineering in addition to the more technical aspects of electoral demography. 
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A. Conflict Termination and Democratization 
‘The choice of appropriate democratic institutions - forms of devolution or autonomy, 
electoral system design, legislative bodies, judicial structures, and so on - designed 
and developed through fair and honest negotiation processes, are vital ingredients in 
building an enduring and peaceful settlement to even the most intractable conflict’ 
(Harris and Reilly 1998: ch. 1; my emphasis). The holding of elections are often 
considered as a key criterion for democracy and democratization, and consequently 
many recent peace agreements aimed at ending civil wars and low-level violent 
conflict include relevant provisions to this end, which then often take on added 
significance as founding elections of a new post-conflict political system. This has 
been the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999) and Northern Ireland 
(1998), to name just a few recent European examples. Apart from ending a conflict, 
these peace agreements thus aim to  establish democratic forms of governance and/or 
improve existing political systems, both with a view towards greater stability and 
inclusiveness. There are two major obstacles in relation to these closely connected 
objectives. The first one is to encourage elites of conflict groups to give up violence 
as a means to pursue political power and rely on exclusively democratic means 
(including elections). The second one is how to deal with the wider legacy of a 
conflict in terms of the political culture it has created, the structures of civil society 
(or lack thereof) and a range of other dimensions normally necessary for sustaining 
democratic political processes. From a broader perspective, the issue is simply this: at 
a time when demands and expectations are high, the capacity of institutions and 
individuals to deliver is limited at best. While international assistance can go some 
way to address capacity issues, implementation (in the sense of translating a peace 
agreement into long-term practice) is essentially a task that can only be performed 
from within the society in question.  
 
The ideal scenario for a post-conflict election, thus is to move straight from a situation 
of instability and exclusiveness (quadrant D) to one of stability and inclusiveness 
(quadrant A), thereby addressing issues of uncertainty, mistrust and fear and 
overcoming the social and institutional legacy of the previous conflict era. This is 
most often reflected in complex electoral formulas and institutional structures to 
assure all former conflict parties that they do indeed have a fair chance of seeing their 
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interests represented and their concerns addressed in new democratic power 
structures. However, recent evidence from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Northern 
Ireland, among others, suggests that inclusive instability (quadrant C) or exclusive 
stability (quadrant B) are far more likely interim, if not long-term outcomes. The 
reasons for this are, for the most part, either the unwillingness or inability of elites to 
cooperate within new democratic structures (persisting mistrust, security dilemmas, 
intragroup out-bidders, spoilers, outside pressures, etc.) and/or the mismatch between 
political institutions and communal aspirations (ill-suited electoral systems, 
institutions favouring genuine power-sharing vs. a desire of communities to separate, 
etc.). The consequences of the failure of elections to move straight from conflict to 
stable and inclusive democracy are obvious: a political system is ‘established’ that is 
unsatisfactory for at least one conflict group, thus making a relapse into violence 
(Northern Ireland) or a sustained international peace-keeping presence (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo) more likely.  
 
B. Democratization 
As the experience of the past decade has shown, the process of transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy in multiethnic societies has its own ethnopolitical 
dynamic. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (as 
well as many countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia), the uncertainties inherent 
in regime change have led in many cases to a resurgence of ethnonationalism, 
resulting in violence in some cases and heightened tensions in others, but also in 
successful accommodation and integration of ethnic minorities. 
 
The nature of authoritarian rule puts such political systems very much into quadrant B 
as relatively stable but exclusive, normally operating a control regime with limited 
cooptation of minority representatives and/or a model of ethnofederalism along the 
lines of the Soviet or Yugoslav cases. The nature of such transitions, then, is 
essentially characterized by the people of a given country repossessing the institutions 
of their state, i.e., establishing the rule of the demos. In multiethnic societies this 
involves a number of problematic issues. Recent experience from the Balkans and the 
former Soviet Union in particular has shown that mobilization along ethnonational 
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lines is a commonly used tool in the overthrow of communist regimes, creating 
immediate anxieties among members of minority groups as to their fate in a 
subsequent ‘democratic’ state. The dissolution of empires, among other things, often 
leads to problems stemming from internal migration and poses difficult questions 
about citizenship and (among others, voting) rights for people who suddenly find 
themselves within the borders of a new state in which they are in a minority position, 
while majorities see their own position threatened by the presence of what they 
perceive as foreigners, former colonists and oppressors. In addition, while control 
regimes, because of their very nature allowed at least for a limited, albeit often not 
very genuine, representation of minority interests, (majoritarian) democracy in and of 
itself does not. The legitimate desire of the majority to regain democratic control does 
often finds itself in conflict with an equally legitimate desire of minorities to have 
their interests ‘adequately’ represented within new political structures. These and a 
range of other issues are often compounded by resource scarcity and a lack of suitably 
qualified personnel with the capacity to implement social, political and economic 
reforms that lead to the creation of an institutional environment that is stable and 
inclusive at the same time.  
 
This ideal scenario of replacing exclusive stability with inclusive stability is often 
hoped to be achieved by a simple opening of society to genuine democratic 
participation. However, institutional choices (electoral system, government system, 
etc.) and broader contextual factors (past and present of interethnic relations, structure 
of the party system, demographic balances between different groups, settlement 
patterns) may interact in ways that make this outcome uncertain. Electoral rules 
and/or election outcomes may be perceived as unfair or as not fairly representing 
social and political realities. From minorities’ points of view, democratization may 
simply mean replacing one form of control system with another one, while majorities 
may resent too much of an effort to achieve inclusiveness. In both cases, instability is 
the likely result, impeding successful democratization in the short term (e.g., Latvia, 
Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria) or long term (Georgia, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Moldova).  
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C. Consolidated Democracy 
In consolidated democracies, the ethnopolitical implications of elections are normally 
less significant than in the context of conflict termination and/or democratization, but 
they are by no means negligible. Recent experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 
for example, confirms that while ethnopolitical issues are unlikely to throw countries 
like Slovakia, Romania or Bulgaria into turmoil or long-term instability, elections 
(including campaigns and the perception of results) provide both focal points for 
ethnic violence and opportunities to strengthen the stability and inclusiveness of 
established political institutions.  
 
Ethnic violence, to the extent that it occurs at all in consolidated multiethnic 
democracies is more likely to take the form of riots or of clashes between supporters 
of rival (ethno-) nationalist parties than that of organized, strategic violence used by 
paramilitary formations and state security forces in more intense violent conflicts or 
civil wars. As such it is sporadic, mostly localized, and involve fringe groups rather 
than mainstream political parties or otherwise organized mainstream groups. 
However, it should also be borne in mind that recurring election-related ethnic 
violence at multiple levels of governance can in the long term escalate and lead to a 
change of the political situation towards greater instability and/or exclusiveness. 
 
Opportunities to strengthen the stability and inclusiveness of established political 
institutions normally arise from the integration of ethnic (minority) parties in 
government coalitions (as has been the case, for example in Slovakia, Bulgaria and 
Romania; cf. Brusis 2003), from the integration of minorities into the broader political 
process by including minority candidates in mainstream/majority party lists, and/or 
from broadening the appeal of political parties and party coalitions along non-ethnic, 
ideological or regional lines. 
 
IV. Election Systems, Campaigns, Conduct and Results 
The choice of an appropriate election system; the way in which election campaigns 
are conducted and the results that elections produce; and the way in which these are 
interpreted by different political actors in a multiethnic society are probably the three 
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most important factors that determine the impact that elections have on the degree of 
stability and inclusiveness of any post-election political process.5 
 
A. Election Systems 
According to Harrop and Miller (1987: 42), three main requirements must be made of 
any electoral system: to ‘make government possible for those at the top and 
acceptable for those underneath’, ‘help reduce political frustration and encourage 
tolerance’, and ‘not add to the problems that already exist’. 
 
Election systems, i.e., the way in which voters can express their preference for a party 
and/or candidate and the way in which votes expressed are converted into seats, play a 
crucial role in determining election outcomes. An election system includes a number 
of different aspects, such as:  
· an electoral formula (majority systems, PR systems, mixed systems, etc.); 
· regulations on assembly size (the number of seats available in the assembly to 
be elected); 
· regulations on district magnitude (the number of seats contested per 
constituency); 
· regulations on voting and ballots (blocked vs. non-blocked lists; open vs. 
closed lists); 
· threshold criteria (minimum share in votes cast to qualify for representation 
under PR systems; also known as quorum). 
 
While the choice of an electoral formula must not be overemphasized in its capacity 
to determine election outcomes, it does have clear and measurable consequences, also 
known as an electoral system’s technical effect (cf., e.g., Lijphart 1994; Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989; Hartmann 2000; Fraenkel and Grofman 2002; Reilly 2001). The 
debate in the academic literature is split between advocates of stability and advocates 
of representativeness (in terms of this paper, synonymous with the degree of 
                                                 
5 Other factors that also have an influence include the rules and structures of the party system (i.e., ban 
on ethnically defined parties, number of parties, state financing of parties, etc.) and elements of 
political culture (e.g., voter turnout, political awareness, tolerance of diversity).  
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inclusiveness). In general, majority/plurality electoral formulas are considered to 
provide greater stability, while PR formulas achieve higher levels of inclusiveness, 
i.e., reflect better the actual degree of diversity in any given society (cf., e.g., Milnor 
1969: 185ff.).6 Recent trends in electoral reform suggest that different variations of 
the mixed-member system might be able to combine the advantages of both of these 
principal electoral formulas by delivering ‘disciplined national parties whose 
individual legislators can be held accountable for their articulation of local interests’ 
(Shugart and Wattenberg 2001: 582). In addition, mixed-member systems allow 
parties to specialize according to their performance strengths by either focussing on 
district or list competition/campaigns, and at the same time providing party executives 
with an opportunity to ensure the presence of legislators who champion local interests 
and/or provide subject expertise in parliament (ibid: 591). While other electoral 
formulas may be able to deliver similar benefits in some of these areas, they also often 
introduce new factors of instability into the political process, such as intraparty 
competition and factionalization (ibid).  
 
At the same time, electoral formulas also have certain psychological effects on voters, 
which in turn shape the prospects of success for particular parties. As electoral 
formulas reward certain voting behaviours while constraining others, voters may opt 
to vote tactically, i.e., try to use the technical effects of the electoral system to effect 
one outcome and/or prevent another (cf. e.g., Hartmann 2000; Venice Commission 
2000). For example, if an electoral formula disadvantages smaller parties, voters who 
may be ideologically closest to such a small party may elect not to ‘waste’ their vote 
on it because it has only a limited chance of success, but instead vote for a larger party 
as their second-best choice or as the ‘lesser of two evils’.  
 
This combination of technical and psychological effects also has consequences for the 
shape of party systems: electoral systems that favour larger parties usually lead to 
two-party systems, whereas more proportional-orientated voting systems create 
                                                 
6 The most common electoral systems can be ranked according to proportionality as follows (beginning 
with the least proportional): multi-member constituency with majority system; single seat plurality; 
single seat majority (also known as two-round majority); virtual proportional system (mixed-member 
system); integral proportional system (single constituency proportional system). Cf. Venice 
Commission (1992). 
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multiparty systems and assemblies with a stronger likelihood of coalition 
governments. In the context of multiethnic societies, it is important to bear in mind 
that factionalization in one or more groups, i.e., the likely split of the group’s votes 
among several parties may effectively exclude the group from effective representation 
under majority/plurality election systems or turn demographic majorities into electoral 
minorities. 
 
These comments generally seem to favour PR systems over majority/plurality systems 
in multiethnic societies, but this presumes the presence of an ethnically divided party 
system, or at least of political parties representing ethnic minority interests. As a 
consequence, unqualified PR systems are more likely to entrench ethnic divisions as 
they limit the incentives for parties to seek to appeal to voters beyond their own ethnic 
group. However, by the same token, PR systems give cross-communal parties a 
chance to achieve parliamentary representation (as the obstacles to do so are generally 
lower) and can thus also be said to limit the technical and psychological thresholds for 
voters to express their desire to move beyond ethnically determined political and 
electoral processes.  
 
Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that the presence of ethnically-based parties is 
not always a given and that the representation of minority interests is indeed possible 
without them. For example, if majority parties support minority members as their 
candidates, representation of minority interests can be achieved through 
majority/plurality systems as well. The same is true if minorities are regionally 
concentrated (i.e., form local majorities in some districts) and politically united (i.e., if 
their members’ votes are not split among several parties). In addition, even where 
ethnic minority parties exist, their representation in parliament can be assisted by 
other means than PR: reserved seats (especially for smaller groups), separate electoral 
rolls (members of different ethnic groups only vote for their own MPs rather than for 
parliament as a whole), and predetermined (proportional) seat allocations to 
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representatives of different ethnic groups are three common, albeit not unproblematic 
mechanisms to achieve this (cf. Harris and Reilly 1998: ch. 4).7 
 
As for assembly size and district magnitude, the rule of thumb is that the larger the 
assembly size and the higher the district magnitude, the more representative the 
assembly as a result. Again, this favours PR systems applied in a single state-wide 
constituency or in several large, multimember constituencies, or mixed-member 
systems that have the same effect. In multimember districts another factor comes into 
play – the mechanism by which votes are translated into seats, but these are overall 
less significant in their impact on overall election outcomes. More importantly, in PR 
systems, applied thresholds influence the degree of inclusiveness in legislatures. High 
thresholds often cancel out the benefits of PR systems, making election results 
sometimes even less representative than if the same election had been conducted 
under a majority/plurality system (e.g., Turkey’s 10% threshold completely distorts 
election results, allowing parties with about 30% of the vote to obtain more than 50% 
of the seats). 
 
The choice between blocked/non-blocked lists and open/closed lists determines the 
ability of voters to ‘personalize’ their vote. Closed and blocked lists only offer the 
choice of voting for a pre-determined party list (i.e., the voter votes for a party list on 
which the ranking of candidates is pre-determined by the party itself). Closed, non-
blocked lists allow the voter to rank individual candidates from one party (i.e., they 
have one vote for a party, but can register a preference as to who they would like to 
see represent this party in the assembly). Open and non-blocked lists allow voters to 
cast their votes across party lines and to express their preference for individual 
candidates on such lists (panachage; used for example in local elections in Poland). In 
relation to non-blocked lists it is important to bear in mind that while these limit the 
ability of party executives to determine who represents the party in the assembly, they 
also increase intraparty competition and can encourage factionalization. By the same 
token, non-blocked lists introduce an element of accountability into the PR system 
                                                 
7 As the Venice Commission (2000) points out, electoral rules on the conversion of votes into seats 
apply above all to political parties/candidates and not to ethnic groups directly. It is only through the links between these 
groups and political parties that the rules become relevant and electoral reform may offer a mechanism to achieve greater 
inclusiveness. 
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and improve the relationship between voter and representative (cf. Hartmann 2000; 
Venice Commission 2000). 
 
Two other issues in relation to election systems are the degree of their complexity and 
the extent to which voters are familiar with them. Very often in multiethnic societies, 
election systems reflect the complexity of issues that they are to address, namely to 
contribute to delivering stable and inclusive government. Unsurprisingly, this implies 
complex rules and regulations, the practical consequences of which cannot always be 
accurately predicted by either their designers (e.g., in Fiji as discussed by Fraenkel 
and Grofman 2002; more generally, Farrell 2001: 193ff.) or by the voters. This is not 
an argument against complex electoral systems, but rather a reminder that the 
introduction of new electoral systems (reforms of existing systems, introduction of 
new ones after prolonged absence of elections) also requires public information and 
education campaigns to ensure voters properly understand the mechanics of the 
election ahead and the consequences of their vote. Familiarity with a given electoral 
system is an equally double-edged sword: on the one hand, familiarity enables voters 
to make better informed decisions about how to use their vote, while, on the other 
hand, it can also mean that sections of the electorate are more likely to distrust results, 
especially if they have experienced discrimination and disadvantage in the past. 
 
B. Election Campaigns 
Election campaigns in many ways reflect the nature of interethnic relations and, by 
the same token, foreshadow the nature of post-election politics. This is particularly the 
case in multiethnic societies: the higher the stakes, the more likely the campaign will 
have a polarizing and radicalizing effect on different groups. This is further 
exacerbated in situations where ethnically-based party systems exist, creating a 
situation in which elections effectively become censuses and their results predictable. 
Of particular relevance for this paper is some recent research by Donald Horowitz 
(2001: 295-308) in which he identifies three patterns of ethnic violence in electoral 
contests – pre-emptive strikes, break-outs and lock-ins. Pre-emptive strikes are aimed 
at enhancing a particular community’s chances of electoral success, for example by 
driving out, intimidating or otherwise influencing voters whose vote is assumed to go 
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to a different political party. Pre-emptive strikes therefore accept ascriptive elements 
of party affiliation, which is in contrast to break-outs where an effort is made to 
reduce this ascriptive element in order to overcome a particular electoral disadvantage 
(Horowitz 2001). This often happens in the form of attempts to broaden the base of an 
existing political party to expand beyond its traditional core ethnic constituency; if 
this is perceived as threatening by other parties and their followers relying on 
ascriptive elements, violence is a likely result (ibid). Pre-emptive strikes and 
breakouts are both types of pre-election violence, while lock-ins trigger post-election 
violence, and are thus more relevant in the context of election results, which I discuss 
below. Campaign-related violence, and this needs to be emphasized, may be locally 
contained or more widespread, depending on stakes and demographic distribution of 
groups. Its likelihood will also depend on the general nature of interethnic relations 
and the legacy of past campaign conducts.  
 
Another dimension of election campaigns which has a bearing on the degree of 
inclusiveness and stability of any post-election political process are campaign 
promises and, more generally speaking, election manifestos. Pre-emptively ruling out 
certain coalitions or polarizing communities and elites does not bode well for a post-
election process in which a stable and inclusive government needs to be formed. 
Either elites stick to their campaign pledges and the government that emerges in the 
aftermath of an election is either exclusive and/or unstable, or elites falter on their 
promises and potentially lose the support of their constituencies, which can then be 
exploited in turn by hardliners within or outside parliament and/or the governing 
party. On the other hand, campaigns fought on substantive rather than ethnic issues 
offer greater promise of post-election political processes that are stable and inclusive, 
as they allow to form governments based on policy – overlap, rather than convenience 
or necessity. 
 
C. Conduct 
Similar to campaigns, the conduct of elections often reflects the general state of 
interethnic relations and can be indicative of the nature of the post-election political 
process. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) identify a number of ‘pathologies’: fraud, 
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malapportionment, gerrymander and turnout. The more serious these pathologies, the 
more they will send a signal to voters and elites that elections will be unfair; that their 
rivals seek, in the guise of democracy, to obtain or retain control of society and the 
less likely will those who feel they are at the receiving end of these pathologies be 
willing to accept election results, and more worryingly in the long term, elections and 
democratic politics in general. On the other hand, proper judicial and administrative 
processes can go a long way not only to ensure that pathologies are reduced, but also 
that elections outcomes are accepted, even if they do not reflect each 
community’s/party’s aspirations (Lyons 2002; Venice Commission 1991).8 Thus, 
while reducing pathologies cannot guarantee fully representative/inclusive assemblies 
and post-election governments, this process can, however, contribute to a more stable 
(i.e., acceptable) post-election political process. 
 
D. Results 
Election results, especially the composition of an elected assembly, are particularly 
important in two ways:  
· Are they acceptable to a broad (i.e., multiethnic) majority at least to the extent 
that political institutions obtain or retain sufficient levels of authority and 
legitimacy? 
· Do they return a legislature and subsequently/simultaneously an executive that 
can work effectively within the institutional parameters of a given state and 
society? 
 
On the surface, both of these questions seem to be related primarily to the stability of 
any post-election political process, but especially in multiethnic societies they 
inevitably also raise issues of inclusiveness. Election results that do not broadly reflect 
the diversity of a given society are unlikely to be acceptable to those who do not feel 
that they are adequately represented. This brings me back to the third pattern of 
violence in electoral contests identified by Horowitz (2001) – the lock-in situation. He 
distinguishes pure lock-in, which occurs when elections confirm the continuation of 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed discussion of different institutional mechanisms on how to monitor and if 
necessary enforce the fair conduct, see ODIHR (2001).   
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dominant, demographic majorities, from an artificial lock-in. In this latter situation, 
elections result in a victory of the minority (an artificial lock-in caused by a party-
political split of the majority or an election system that translates a majority of votes 
into a minority of seats). Consequently, violence has different points of origin: the 
minority in case of a pure lock-in, while the violent backlash is likely to come from 
the majority in cases of artificial lock-in. Neither situation, however, is conducive to 
stability and inclusiveness. 
 
However, the acceptability of election results also depends on the conduct of election 
campaigns and the elections themselves, on the stakes in elections and, more 
generally speaking, on the state of interethnic relations in a given society. In this 
context, it is also important to note that the right to vote must not be confused with the 
right to representation (Grofman et al. 1992: 129f.), and especially not to have one’s 
interests represented by the party one has voted for and/or in that party’s anticipated 
strength.  
 
V. Electoral and Post-Electoral Politics in Multiethnic Societies: 
Some Conclusions 
Electoral and post-electoral politics in multiethnic societies are not only determined 
by factors exclusively related to the electoral contest. Elections are only one in a much 
broader spectrum of factors that have an impact on the stability of the political process 
and more generally on interethnic relations. While the design of the election system, 
the conduct of electoral campaigns and of the elections themselves, and, of course the 
results that elections yield and the way in which these results are interpreted and acted 
upon are significant in shaping electoral and post-electoral politics in multiethnic 
societies; I want to turn to a more general, context-setting factor first, namely the 
nature of ethnic politics.  
 
The more the political process in a multiethnic society is framed in ethnic terms (party 
system, structure of institutions, proportionality of resource allocation, etc.), the more 
elections take on an ethnic dimension as well. In addition to such formal institutions, 
norms that exist within individual groups play an important role as they too determine 
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what political actions are possible or impossible for voters and their elites (cf. 
Hulterström 2002). If these norms encourage separation between groups and votes to 
be cast only within the spectrum of one’s own group, formal institutions of ethnic 
politics are strengthened as well, including the conduct and outcome of elections.9 
This may be a banal observation, but it is important inasmuch as it contextualizes the 
function and consequences of elections. If a society is deeply divided, if communities 
refuse to coexist within the same polity, if elites are unwilling or unable to cooperate, 
no carefully designed electoral system will be able to deliver stable and inclusive 
post-electoral political processes. ‘Electoral riots require elections’, is an observation 
by Donald Horowitz (2001: 308), in other words fragile political institutions in 
polarized societies are unlikely to be mended by the calling of elections, and stability 
and inclusiveness may be better served by the postponing of elections in democratic 
systems or the abandonment of the idea of early elections in democratizing/war-
terminating contexts. 
 
By the same token, it is true that elections play a crucial role in influencing political 
processes in multiethnic societies, and it is one of the central assumptions of this 
paper that they have catalytic and direct consequences for the degree of stability and 
inclusiveness that political processes in such societies exhibit. As focal points of 
potential change, elections (including election campaigns) pose difficult challenges to 
elites and electorates. These challenges will be felt more acutely the higher the stakes 
are (or the higher they are constructed). Real or perceived security issues, resource 
allocation problems and concerns regarding fair and equal/proportional representation 
can polarize and radicalize electorates and (all or some of) the political parties they 
are supposed to vote for.  
 
The most important direct consequences of elections are obviously their results. While 
it is true that the choice of electoral systems and the fine-tuning of specific rules can 
shape election outcomes, it is ultimately the will of the voter that determines the 
overall composition of assemblies and/or governments (Venice Commission 2000). 
However, in the same way in which polarization and radicalization are based on 
                                                 
9 It is also important to note that an ethnically-based party system is much more affected by electoral 
 21 
choice, especially among political elites, so are post-electoral political processes not 
foregone conclusions based purely on election results. Parliaments and governments 
have, and make, choices as to how to conduct politics. Clear, absolute majorities do 
not have to lead to the neglect of minority interests; multiparty coalition governments 
do not have to be unstable and to collapse at the first difficult decision.  
 
Apart from the role of elites, another qualification of the direct impact of elections on 
the stability and inclusiveness of political processes in multiethnic societies is the 
broader design of political institutions. Recent scholarship and political practice have 
developed a wide range of power-sharing mechanisms that can be usefully employed 
in the process of state construction and consolidation in multiethnic societies: 
consociations, ethnofederalism, territorial autonomy, etc., are all designs that can 
mitigate electoral outcomes that would otherwise have ‘complicated’ interethnic 
relations. Careful institutional design is, therefore, an important component in all 
efforts to achieve stable and inclusive political processes in multiethnic societies, and 
as such a useful complement to the design of electoral systems. Ethnopolitics may 
complicate elections, but it does not make them impossible, nor do elections in 
multiethnic societies preclude stable and inclusive democratic government – they are, 
in fact, a necessary condition for it.  
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